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PHILOSOPHY AND LANGUAGE IN INDIA:
A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Johannes Bronkhorst
ndian philosophy has dedicated much thought to questions related to language. It
would yet be a mistake to limit one’s attention to ideas about language engendered
in and by Indian philosophy. Ideas about language were current in India well before
there was anything one might be inclined to call philosophy, and philosophy, when it
arose, was deeply influenced by those prior ideas.
Concern with language characterized Brahmanism from as far as we can look back.
One of  the features that distinguished Brahmins as a group from everyone else was
their mastery of  the Veda. The Veda is, first and foremost, a collection of  powerful for-
mulas (called mantra) that must be recited at appropriate occasions (primarily rituals)
and that will then have effects in this or a future world. Since the respect and the asso-
ciated privileges that Brahmins received were inseparable from this sacred and to some
extent secret knowledge, the efficacy of  Vedic formulas was not going to be put into
question by Brahmins, not even by philosophically inclined Brahmins.
The idea soon came up that the efficacy of  Vedic formulas is due, or at least relat-
ed to the presumed fact that the connection between the world and the words of  the
Vedic language is particularly close. One of  the consequences of  this belief  is that we
can presumably learn a great deal about the nature of  reality by studying the Vedic
language, i.e. Sanskrit. This conviction finds expression on an unprecedented scale in
the parts of  Vedic literature that are not mantra, i.e. in the so-called Brahmanas
 (including most of  the early Upanisads). These texts are full of  semantic etymologies,
etymologies that do not seek to elucidate the history of  words (impossible in a world
that does not recognize the reality of  linguistic change) but rather aims at discovering
the essence of  a thing by relating the word that refers to it to other similar words. Sim-
ilarities between words brought in this way invisible links to light between the things
they denoted.
No one would dream of  claiming that semantic etymologies have much to do with
philosophy. This is no reason to underestimate the importance of  semantic etymolo-
gies in ancient India. Attempts were made to discover and formulate the rules that sup-
posedly underlie correct etymologizing. They found expression in a text that has sur-
vived, Yaska’s Nirukta (ca. 3rd cent. bce). In parallel with this activity, and inspired by the
same conviction that Sanskrit is close to reality, grammatical analysis arose, culminat-
ing in the famous grammar of  Panini, the Astadhyayi (ca. 4th cent. bce). In this last case
we may be tempted, and justified, to speak of  a scientific rather than of  a philosophical
accomplishment. We will yet see that, in due time, the ideas underlying these develop-
ments also came to inspire philosophy.
Johannes Bronkhorst, Université de Lausanne, Anthropole 4118, ch-1015 Lausanne; johannes.bronkhorst@
unil.ch
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Systematic philosophy in India involved for an important part of  its history not only
Brahmanism, but also Buddhism and Jainism. Of  these three participants, Brahmanism
and Buddhism were predominant, and the interaction between these two is responsi-
ble for many of  the developments during the first millennium or so. Buddhism, as a
matter of  fact, developed what might be called systematic philosophy before either of
the two others did, and there are good reasons to think that both Brahmanism and Jain-
ism were influenced by the earliest Buddhist attempts at systematic philosophizing.
Buddhism did not share Brahmanism’s ideas about language. For early Buddhism
there was not one language closer to reality than any other, and indeed, the very notion
that language and reality are intimately connected was foreign to early Buddhist
thought. Buddhism’s earliest attempts at systematic philosophy (from ca. 2nd cent. bce),
however, did bring language into the picture, but quite differently from Brahmanism
and without being influenced by the latter.
To understand the role of  language in early Buddhist systematic philosophy, some
of  its main features will have to be introduced, if  ever so sketchily. This earliest at-
tempt to systematize the Buddhist tradition and create a coherent ontology took place
in the northwest of  the Indian subcontinent, far away from the Brahmanical heart-
land, and presumably in a region where there were no Brahmins or at best only very
few of  them. This attempt – the outcome of  which has survived in the scholasticism
(Abhidharma) of  the Sarvastivada school of  Buddhism – took as point of  departure a
number of  Buddhist doctrinal elements, but reinterpreted them, sometimes almost
beyond recognition.
Sarvastivada came to accept a list of  ultimate elements of  existence. As elements of
existence it chose the so-called dharmas, which they and other Buddhists had been col-
lecting and arranging in lists, on the assumption that they constituted crucial items in
the Buddha’s teaching. These dharmas had originally not been collected for ontological
purposes, but this is the role they acquired in Sarvastivada thought: everything, it main-
tained, is constituted of  dharmas. These dharmas, moreover, were now thought of  as
being momentary.
Seen in this way, all things we are aware of  – primarily the objects of  our experience,
such as houses and chariots, but also human beings – are successions and collections of
large numbers of  dharmas. The Sarvastivada scholiasts added a further requirement:
collections and/or successions of  dharmas do not give rise to new objects. Put differ-
ently, only the dharmas really exist, and the objects that they seem to constitute don’t.
Concretely speaking, this means that an object such as a chariot does not really exist.
This particular instance, the chariot, plays a central role in a famous text composed
in northwest India, presumably in its core during the last centuries preceding the Com-
mon Era. This text is called «The questions of  King Milinda» (Milindapañha), and relates
a discussion that supposedly took place between the Greek king Milinda (known from
Greek sources as King Menander; don’t forget that since Alexander of  Macedonia
Greeks ruled off and on over parts of  north-western India, until about 150 bce; Menan-
der was one of  the last of  these rulers) and a Buddhist monk called Nagasena. Nagase-
na explains to the king that, contrary to the latter’s claim, he could not have arrived by
chariot, because there is no such thing as a chariot. The question as to how the confu-
sion can be explained is answered in the following manner: there is no chariot, and what
we call chariot is nothing but a word, an expression.
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This passage of  the Milindapañha is but the most famous expression of  an idea that
comes to be repeated in numerous other Buddhist texts, and is central to their think-
ing. According to this idea, the world of  our experience is ultimately unreal, and due to
the words of  language. In other words, there is an intimate connection between the
world of  our experience and language, this because the world of  our experience results
from it and is in a certain way created by language.
Notice that at this point Buddhism and Brahmanism share an important position:
both are convinced that the world of  our experience and language closely correspond
to each other. However, there are important differences. Brahmanism identified the
world of  our experience with the real world, where Buddhism denied that the world of
our experience is real. Moreover, Brahmanism accepted this correspondence only for
one language, Sanskrit, whereas the Buddhist scholiasts had no such exclusive prefer-
ence for one particular language.
Let us now recall that the Brahmanical concern with language, unlike that of  the Bud-
dhists, was not the outcome of  philosophical developments. The belief  in the corre-
spondence between Sanskrit and reality is as old as Brahmanism, and was quite inde-
pendent of  any attempts at systematization. It is however easy to understand that, once
Brahmanism created an ontology of  its own, this old Brahmanical belief  had its role to
play. This is particularly true of  the Brahmanical ontology called Vai®esika.
Vai®esika did more than systematize preconceived Brahmanical notions as to the re-
lationship between words and things. A close inspection of  its ontology reveals that it
had taken over several notions from Sarvastivada ontology, frequently by turning them
upside down. Consider the Sarvastivada position according to which there are no com-
posite things (such as chariots): only their constituent elements exist. In Vai®esika this
position takes the opposite form: composite things do exist beside their constituent
parts. In other words, a vase and its two halves are three different entities.
There are further examples of  the influence of  Buddhist scholasticism on Vai®esika,
but here we must concentrate on the way in which Vai®esika systematized the belief  in
the close relationship between words and things. Its basic assumption as to this rela-
tionship implied that any fundamental categorization of  words was automatically a cat-
egorization of  the things denoted by those words. For a basic categorization of  words
the philosophers of  this school had to look no further than the Mahabhasya of  Patañ-
jali, a major (and very voluminous) treatise on grammar that was widely studied by
grammarians and non-grammarians alike from a time soon after its composition in the
middle of  the second century bce. Patañjali distinguishes three kinds of  words, which
he calls jati®abda, guna®abda and kriya®abda. These correspond to our nouns, adjectives
and verbs, and designate substances (dravya), qualities (guna) and actions (kriya) re-
spectively. Following the Vai®esikas’ way of  thinking, this indicates that a major part of
the ‘things’ in the world are substances, qualities or actions. Patañjali’s observations go
somewhat further, for he points out that a jati®abda denotes a substance or a genus (jati).
On the common sense level probably intended by Patañjali, this makes good sense:
many nouns can refer either to a concrete object, or to that object in general. The word
«dog» is used in the following two sentences in altogether different ways: «my dog is
black» and «the dog is a domestic animal»; in the former of  these two examples Patañ-
jali might say that it refers to a substance, in the latter to a genus. The ontologically in-
clined Vai®esikas concluded from this that each substance has a universal (jati or
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samanya) that inheres in it; they extended this observation to qualities and actions. They
arrived in this manner at four categories, that were essentially inspired by language: sub-
stances, qualities, actions and universals. They added a few more categories to assure
the coherence of  their system, but it is clear that their system of  categories was based
on and in an important way an expression of  their understanding of  language.
We noted above that Vai®esika drew inspiration from Buddhist scholasticism by turn-
ing a number of  its ideas upside down. One might say the same about a Brahmanical
thinker of  the fifth century ce who became known as the philosopher of  grammar, but
whose ideas went well beyond only grammar. This thinker is Bhartrhari, and he devel-
oped an ontological vision of  the world that is best understood in contrast with Sar-
vastivada thought. Recall that these Buddhists maintained that only the ultimate con-
stituents of  our world (i.e. the dharmas) really exist, and that we owe it to the words of
language that we believe that composite objects, too, exist, where in reality they don’t.
Bhartrhari put this scheme on its head. According to him, only the whole of  all there is
has real existence. Its constituent parts, which in this case include the objects of  our dai-
ly experience, owe their existence to language; more correctly: we owe it to language
that we believe that these intermediate objects exist, even though their existence is rel-
ative at best.
Bhartrhari’s skill as a grammarian gave him the means to show that the passage from
less to more real goes from part to whole, not the other way round. For grammarians
analyse words in component parts, such as stems and suffixes, which are, when it comes
to it, inventions of  those grammarians. Indeed, different grammars propose sometimes
different ways to analyse the same word. It follows that the word is more real than its
grammatical constituents. In a similar vein it can be argued that a sentence is more real
than its constituent words, and so on. «And so on» means, for Bhartrhari, moving on to-
ward ever more encompassing linguistic units, until the largest linguistic unit there is,
the Veda. In parallel with this linguistic ascension, there is the ascension of  things toward
ever more encompassing entities, the largest one being Brahman. Brahman is, as a mat-
ter of  fact, the totality of  all there is, was, and will be. Ultimately only Brahman is real.
We notice that in Bhartrhari’s scheme of  things language does more than just illus-
trating the higher existential status of  wholes with respect to parts. Language does
much more. It divides ultimate reality in such a manner as to arrive at the unreal world
we live in. Both Bhartrhari and Buddhist scholasticism agree that the world of  our ex-
perience is not ultimately real and owes its pseudo-existence to language. Only when
talking about what is ultimately real they part ways: where Buddhist scholasticism
moves toward the ultimate constituents, Bhartrhari moves toward the ultimate whole.1
The Buddhist Sarvastivada school also initiated another important development relat-
ed to language. Recall that these Buddhists had come to the conclusion that words are
behind our mistaken view that macroscopic objects like chariots, houses and persons
exist. None of  the familiar objects of  our daily experience exist, and this includes words,
too. Put this way, one might be led to think that certain non-existent things (words) are
behind our mistaken belief  in the existence of  other non-existent things (chariots, hous-
es, persons, etc.). This looks circular, and it is possible that the early Sarvastivadins felt
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uncomfortable with it. We have no texts in which they actually say so, but we do notice
that the list of  dharmas that they accepted contains some items that correspond to lin-
guistic units: in the classical enumerations there are three of  them, that correspond to
words, sentences and individual speech sounds respectively; originally there may have
been only two, corresponding to words and single sounds.1 These dharmas, like virtu-
ally all other dharmas, were of  course momentary.
We may assume that the inclusion of  these three (or two) items in the list of  dharmas
resolved a difficulty with which the Sarvastivadins were confronted, presumably the
one pointed out above. However, the ontological status of  words, sentences and even
single sounds is problematic even for those who do not otherwise adhere to Sarvasti-
vada ontology. For indeed, words and sentences are, naively speaking, sequences of
sounds, and even single sounds extend over time and are therefore sequences of  con-
stituent noises. Seen this way, can one ever say that there is a word or other linguistic
unit? Since their constituents succeed each other, they never coexist. So does it make
sense to say that there ever is such a thing as a word?
The problem came to intrigue Brahmanical thinkers, too, and some of  them pro-
posed a solution that is in all essentials identical to that of  the Sarvastivadins. Beside the
sequence of  sounds (or vibrations, or whatever) that accompany and reveal a word, they
postulated the existence of  a word that is different from those sounds (or vibrations,
etc.). The expression often used to designate this entity is sphota, it being understood
that the sphota is the real word. This sphota, then, is an ontologically distinct entity, and
one that is revealed by transient sounds, but which is itself  eternal. The same notion
could, of  course, be extended to other linguistic units, notably sounds and sentences.
Bhartrhari was one among those who accepted the sphota, but others, too, accepted the
unitary and indivisible nature of  the word; among these we may count Mandana Mi®ra
(7th cent. ce; author of  a treatise called Sphotasiddhi «Proof  of  sphota») and the author
of  the Yoga®astra (ca. 400 ce; under sutra 3.17).2
The sphota makes a reappearance in some far more recent grammatical authors. We
will see below that this more recent sphota differed in some essential respects from its
predecessors.
Recall that Brahmanical and Buddhist thinkers agreed, in spite of  their numerous dif-
ferences, on one issue: The world of  our common sense experience corresponds close-
ly to the words of  language. For the Buddhists this meant that the objects of  our every-
day experience – such as chariots, houses, and persons – have no real existence; we are
tricked by words into believing that they exist. For the Brahmins there was no question
of  doubting the reality of  the world of  our experience; the objects of  our experience
and the words of  Sanskrit correspond to each other quite simply because the Sanskrit
language is close to reality.
The limited agreement between Buddhists and Brahmins was enough to plunge both
of  them into a problem that was going to have a determining effect on the future shape
of  Indian philosophy. Both accepted the close correspondence between the world of
philosophy and language in india 15
1 See Bronkhorst 1987, part iii. The dharmas concerned are called namakaya, padakaya and vyañjanakaya; the
first two of  these three terms may originally have been synonyms.
2 See Dasgupta 1924, 179 ff. («Appendix»). Note that the author of  the Yogabhasya, whatever his real name (Patañ-
jali or Vindhyavasin, or something else), was certainly not called Vyasa; Bronkhorst 1984; Maas 2006, xii ff.
our everyday experience and the words of  language. Both agreed that, in a certain way,
the world of  our ordinary experience had been created by the words of  language (even
though the Brahmins thought that this world of  ordinary experience was ultimately re-
al, whereas the Buddhists maintained that it was not). Both ran into difficulties when
they tried to extend this correspondence to statements.
These difficulties resulted from a presupposition that all thinkers concerned took for
granted, a presupposition that is indeed closely associated with the shared belief  in a
close correspondence between words and things. A true affirmative statement, these
thinkers assumed, must describe a situation that is constituted of  elements that corre-
spond to the words of  that statement; we will call this the «correspondence principle».
The statement «the cow eats grass» describes a situation in which we find a cow, grass,
and the activity of  eating. At first sight this seems unproblematic, even though differ-
ent interpreters may assign a different ontological status to the constituent elements
(cow, grass, eating). All interpreters however, quite independently of  their ontological
preferences, are confronted with a problem in the case of  statements that refer to things
that come into being. Take «The potter makes a pot». The shared presupposition claims
that this statement describes a situation in which there is a pot. But clearly, if  there is al-
ready a pot in this situation, the potter does not need to make it.
Judging by the many different solutions that were proposed to this difficulty, it is clear
that there were virtually no philosophers in India during the first half  of  the first
 millennium who were willing to question the presupposition, i.e. the correspondence
principle presented above. They all felt that there had to be a pot, or at the very least
something corresponding to this word, in the situation described by «The potter makes
a pot».
It seems likely that the problems associated with the correspondence principle were
first pointed out, and exploited to their advantage, by Buddhist thinkers. They were in-
deed the ones who had most to gain, for they maintained that the world of  our ordi-
nary experience does not really exist. The new problems, as interpreted by them, mere-
ly confirmed their position. Since there is no pot in the situation described by «The
potter makes a pot», clearly the potter can make no pot. What is more, production in
all its forms is self-contradictory, and therefore impossible. Nagarjuna (2nd cent. ce?),
the first thinker to make systematic use of  these difficulties, concluded that the world
of  our experience is ‘empty’ (®unya), i.e. non-existent. It is true that the same arguments
could be used against the ontology developed by the Sarvastivadins (see above), but this
did not deter Nagarjuna. His philosophy (if  this is the term to use for a vision of  the
universe that is so utterly negative) came to be known by the names Madhyamaka
 «Middle [path]» and ±unyavada «Doctrine [according to which all is] empty».
This is not the place to present a complete survey of  the many ways in which differ-
ent philosophical schools tried to solve the problems associated with statements like
«The potter makes a pot». We saw that Buddhist thinkers were less threatened by these
problems than Brahmanical philosophers, but this does not mean that all Buddhists
agreed with Nagarjuna. The Brahmanical philosophers of  that time were not willing
to abandon their belief  in the reality of  the world of  our experience, so they were faced
with the challenge to come up with an altogether different interpretation of  statements
of  that kind that would leave the common sense world intact.
Their main two answers are known by the names satkarya-vada and asatkarya-vada.
Satkarya-vada is the doctrine according to which the effect (karya) exists (sat) in its cause.
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In the situation described by «The potter makes a pot», the potter works on clay. Clay
is the cause, the pot is the effect. According to the satkarya-vada, the effect exists in its
cause, the pot is present in the clay out of  which it will be formed. Whatever the intu-
itive appeal of  this position, it is the one adopted by several Brahmanical philosophical
schools (initially Samkhya, later also Advaita-Vedanta), and it is with the help of  this po-
sition they solved the problems associated with the correspondence principle.
Our analysis so far has shown that these problems resulted from a belief  concerning
the relationship between language and reality, a belief  in what we have called the cor-
respondence principle. Thinkers who followed or sympathized with Vai®esika ontology,
aware of  the role of  language in these problems, looked for a solution in the relation-
ship between words and things. They knew that a noun can refer either to a concrete
object, or to that object in general, and had indeed postulated that beside individual ob-
jects there are universals. Since nouns refer to both, the word ‘pot’ in «The potter makes
a pot» also refers to the universal that inheres in all pots. Well, universals were believed
to be eternal and omnipresent. Conclusion: there is something in the situation de-
scribed by «The potter makes a pot» that the word ‘pot’ refers to. The thinkers who
adopted this solution rejected the satkarya-vada; their position is therefore referred to
as asatkarya-vada «the doctrine according to which the effect (karya) does not exists (sat)
in its cause».
As stated earlier, many other solutions to the problems connected with the corre-
spondence principle were proposed; it would take us too far to review them all. They
are referred to by different names. We have discussed ®unya-vada, satkarya-vada,
asatkarya-vada; we can add sarvasti-vada,1 anekanta-vada, ajati-vada and apoha-vada, but
even this longer list does not contain an exhaustive enumeration of  all the solutions
 proposed.2 From among these additional solutions, only the apoha-vada can here briefly
be discussed.
The word apoha means exclusion, and the apoha-vada is the doctrine according to
which words denote by exclusion. The originator of  this doctrine is the Buddhist Dig-
naga (ca. 500 ce), but he was only the first one in a long line of  Buddhist thinkers who
adhered to it. Very briefly put, this doctrine maintains that a word, say «pot», does not
denote an object, in this case a pot, but rather excludes everything that is not a pot.
Since it does away with the notion that there must be a correspondence between
words and things, the correspondence principle and the accompanying problems dis-
appear with it.
The apoha-vada was however more than only a semantic theory. It was inseparable
from the two-tier view of  reality that had characterized Buddhist ontology since the
days of  early Sarvastivada, and whose main characteristic was that language operates
in a world that is not ultimately real. Dignaga maintained that the real world (called sva-
laksana «having its own characteristics») consists only of  particulars and is only accessi-
ble to the senses. Language, on the other hand, operates in an ultimately unreal world
that is characterized by the general (samanya-laksana). This is also the world of  concepts
and the world in which inferences have their place.
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1 This word, which became the name of  a philosophical school discussed earlier, literally refers to the position
according to which everything (sarva), including past and future things, exists (asti). This was one of  the doctrines
of  the Sarvastivada school, and it provided an answer to the problems that was not altogether dissimilar to the
one provided by the satkarya-vada. 2 See Bronkhorst 1999.
Dignaga was as a matter of  fact inspired by inferences when formulating his apoha-
vada. He had noticed that inferences work in two directions that are logically equiva-
lent: saying «if  there is smoke on the mountain, then there is fire» is logically equivalent
to «if  there is no fire on the mountain, then there is no smoke»; if  B follows from A,
then not-A follows from not-B, and vice versa. Applying the same idea to the process of
referring gives: saying that all pots and only those are referred to by the word “pot” is
equivalent to saying that all things that are not pots are not referred to by this word. The
apoha doctrine was adopted and refined by numerous later Buddhist thinkers.
At this point a few words must be said about the Brahmanical school of  thought called
Mimamsa. This was essentially a hermeneutical rather than a philosophical school. Its
stated aim was to interpret the Vedic text corpus. However, interpreting a text, and a
Vedic text in particular, raises a number of  fundamental questions, and Mimamsa in its
classical shape (i.e., the shape we find in ±abara’s extensive Mimamsa-bhasya, a text be-
longing to the middle of  the first millennium ce) proposed answers to them.
Consider, to begin with, a situation of  ordinary verbal communication, in which one
person informs another one about a state of  affairs (e.g., «It rains outside»). The person
who receives this communication, can he or she assume that it contains reliable infor-
mation? This, obviously, depends on the trustworthiness of  the speaker. If  the speaker
is not himself  properly informed, or if  he wishes to misinform his interlocutor, then ob-
viously his communication does not transmit reliable information. Much depends
therefore on the reliability of  the speaker (or writer, or originator of  the verbal com-
munication). The interpretation of  every text has to begin with an interrogation as to
the trustworthiness of  its author. What is more, if  a text is not reliable, this is due to the
fact that its author is not reliable.
The question of  unreliability does not arise in the case of  Vedic texts. These texts, ac-
cording to a fundamental tenet of  Mimamsa, have no author: they were always there.
Being texts without author, the suspicion of  untrustworthiness does not arise, and they
have to be considered reliable, even infallible.
This does not yet solve all the problems. Even a reliable verbal communication may
be misunderstood, this because sentences can be variously interpreted. The correct in-
terpretation is the most direct interpretation, the one that least deviates from the exact
wording of  the text. This interpretation may not be difficult to find as long as one deals
with short sentences, it becomes much more difficult when the text to be interpreted
is the vast Vedic corpus, in which sentences from different parts may at first sight seem
to contradict each other. Mimamsa developed a number of  principles meant to deal
with these complications.
An application of  the considerations mentioned so far soon reveals that not all Vedic
sentences can be taken at face value. Some will have to be read metaphorically, in the
light of  other sentences. This is especially true of  Vedic sentences describing historical
facts: since the Veda was always there, it cannot record historical facts, for the simple
reason that the Veda was already in existence before those historical facts took place.
A similar reasoning applies to all statements of  fact in the Veda. Since we have other
means to be informed about facts – among them perception, and inference – statements
of  fact in the Veda run the risk of  being in conflict with information based on other
sources of  knowledge. Mimamsa concluded from this that all Vedic statements of  fact
have to be understood metaphorically, in the light of  other sentences.
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But which are the Vedic sentences that can be taken literally? According to Mimam-
sa, only injunctions can not possibly come in conflict with other sources of  informa-
tion. No perception, no inference will ever tell us anything about what we must do (or
must abstain from doing). The Vedic injunctions stand therefore unchallenged, and
their literal interpretation is possible and even necessary.
This introduction to some of  the fundamentals of  Mimamsa thought is necessary to
understand some developments in linguistic philosophy that began in Mimamsa but
subsequently touched other schools of  thought. For Mimamsa did not confine itself  to
identifying injunctions and arguing that they had to figure centrally in a most direct un-
derstanding of  the Veda, it also analyzed the way in which individual injunctions are
understood. It did so by identifying the expressive unit in the sentence which conveys
the sense of  injunction (the verbal ending) and by showing that the meanings of  all the
remaining expressive units are subordinate to it. In the course of  time they extended
this analysis so that it came to include non-injunctive sentences, and arrived at a gener-
al theory of  the way verbal communication is understood (®abdabodha). This cognition
can be described in terms of  a hierarchical organization of  the meanings of  all the
grammatical elements that are used in the sentence concerned. For the Mimamsa the
meaning of  the verb ending was and remained central, and the sense they attributed to
it was bhavana «bringing into being».
The notion that verbal cognition can be described in terms of  the hierarchical or-
ganization of  the meanings of  the grammatical elements that make up the sentence
was taken over, some centuries later, by representatives of  the Nyaya school of  philos-
ophy, first Udayana (ca. 1000 ce) then Gange®a (14th cent. ce) and others. This school had
incorporated the Vai®esika ontology discussed above, and was therefore committed to
the view that external reality consists of  a limited number of  ‘things’, among which sub-
stances, qualities and actions are central. Among these three, substances are funda-
mental in a most literal sense, because other existing ‘things’, including qualities and ac-
tions, depend on substances and inhere in them. No doubt under the influence of  this
ontological commitment, the thinkers of  the Nyaya school were inclined to analyze
verbal cognition in a parallel fashion: in their hierarchical organization of  meanings the
substance (expressed by the subject of  the sentence) is central, everything else, includ-
ing the action expressed by the verb, subordinate to it.
In the discussions within and between the schools of  Mimamsa and Nyaya, a central
question concerned the main qualificand in a sentence: for the former it was the «bring-
ing into being» (bhavana) expressed by the verbal ending, for the latter it was the sub-
ject, i.e. the word with nominative case ending. Both made extensive use of  the gram-
matical analysis of  the Sanskrit language provided by Panini. That is to say, they used
the expressive units identified by that grammarian, but did not always accept the se-
mantic function that he had given to those units. This was unacceptable to a number
of  grammarians of  the Paninian tradition. They joined the debate, be it at a late date
(around 1600 ce), and defended what they considered the main qualificand of  a sen-
tence according to Panini, viz., the action. Representatives of  these three schools were
henceforth engaged in an intense and often highly technical debate, a debate from
which no ultimate victor emerged.1
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1 An excellent historical presentation of  verbal cognition in Indian philosophy is provided by Diaconescu
(2010).
All the participants in this debate had to face the same question: how do sentences
express more than the mere accumulation of  the meanings of  their constituent parts?1
They proposed different answers: some had recourse to the secondary denotation of
words in sentences, others invoked the intention of  the speaker. The grammarians were
in this respect luckier than their opponents, for they could draw on the notion of  spho-
ta that had been introduced many centuries before them. The old sphota had been an
ontologically distinct entity, that owed its existence to ontological reflections. The new
grammarians had a new role for it, emphasizing its semantic role: the sphota, for them,
is a single meaning bearer. Since there are word and sentence sphotas, which are differ-
ent from each other, it follows that the sentence is an altogether different expressive
unit, that does not need to justify its meaning on the basis of  its constituent words. If,
therefore, the sentence meaning turned out to be more than, or at any rate different
from, the accumulated word meanings, this did not need to disturb the new grammar-
ians. These same new grammarians were in no hurry to admit that they had assigned
a new role to the sphota, an omission which has been responsible for some puzzlement
among modern researchers.2
The Nyaya view of  verbal cognition was more than a mere reflection of  the ontologi-
cal categories accepted in that school. Recall that the Buddhists, and Dignaga and his
successors in particular, had distinguished between the reality accessible to our senses
on one hand, and the ultimately unreal world of  concepts, words and inferences on the
other. This meant that they accepted two kinds of  perceptual cognition, the one cor-
rect but inexpressible in language, the other expressible but incorrect. Few Brahmani-
cal thinkers were ready to join the Buddhists in refusing ultimate reality to the world
of  concepts, words and inferences. Quite on the contrary, a Brahmanical thinker like
Bhartrhari stated in a famous stanza that all knowledge is as it were pierced by words.3
However, philosophers of  the Nyaya school and certain others borrowed some
 essential features from the Buddhist distinction. They ended up with a two-tiered un-
derstanding of  perceptual cognition: nonconceptual (avikalpaka) and conceptual
(savikalpaka), both correct. Inevitably, their conceptual perception was coloured by
words, and was therefore very similar to cognition derived from words, i.e., verbal cog-
nition. Indeed, the author of  the Nyaya Siddhantamuktavali (16th century) states in so
many words that – were it not for the memory that it is words that produce verbal cog-
nition – perception might give rise to verbal cognition. Language is in this way believed
to play a role even in perception.
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